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LA:soR LA.w-T.AFT-HARTLEY AcT-lli:GHT OF BoARD To DISMISS
ilNF.AIR LABOR PR.AcTicE COMPLAINTS FOR PoLICY RE.AsoNs-In re-

cent months the National Labor Relations Board and its General Counsel, Robert N. Denham, have come to grips over the right of the Board
to dismiss unfair labor practice charges on ground that to take jurisdiction would not effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations
Act. 1 After unsuccessfully opposing the Board in several cases,2 Mr.
Denham aired the controversy publicly,3 charging the Board with application of "their old Wagner Act formulae" when "the principle of the
theory has been repudiated by the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act."
The Board retaliated by revoking all the General Counsel's independent powers not resting in specific provisions of the 1947 Act.4 The
President attempted to do away with even these powers in his recently
defeated Administrative Reorganization Plan Number 12.5
51 Stat. L. 136, 29 U.S.C. (1947) §§141-197.
.
H. W. Smith d.b.a. A-1 Photo Service, 83 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (1949); Haleston Drug
Stores, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. No. 125 (1949); Pereira Studios, 83 N.L.R.B. No. 87 (1949);
Row Construction Co., 88 N.L.R.B. No. 132 (1950).
3 Address before New York Building Trades Employers' Association, January 12, 1950,
reproduced in 16 VITAL SPEECHES 226-231 (1950); N.Y. TxMEs, January 13, 1950, p. 1:2.
4 See 83 CCH LAlloR LAw REPORTER WEEKLY SUMMARY (March 2, 1950). In
defending Board decisions before the courts the General Counsel must proceed in "full accordance with the directions of the Board." The new regulations appear in 15 FED. REc.
1088 (1950). 84 CCH LAlloR LAw REPORTER WEEKLY SUMMARY (March 9, 1950)
reports that Mr. Denham refuses to obey what he regards as a curtailment of his independent
authority under the act, including the right to make policy decisions relative to local-type
businesses.
5 Plans are submitted by the President pursuant to the Reorganization Act of 1949, c. 226,
P.L. 109 (June 20, 1949). By section 6(a), had the plan not been disapproved by an actual
majority of either house of Congress within sixty days from date of submission, it would have
gone into effect at the end of the period. The plan [H. Doc. 503, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950),
1

2
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The General Counsel bases his argument against the power of the
Board to dismiss for policy reasons on section 3(d) of the amended
act, which gives the General Counsel "£.nal authority" over issuance of
unfair labor practice complaints, and upon the legislative intent to
separate the judicial functions of the Board from its prosecuting func- .
tions, and to give the General Counsel the power to determine policy
in unfair labor practice cases. The Board contends that once a complaint is qrought, the General Counsel's "£.nal authority" is exhausted,
so that the Board is then free to dismiss on policy grounds. The Board
also denies any legislative intent to limit it to quasi-judicial functions.
The Board is empowered to take jurisdiction in ~y case involving
an unfair labor practice "affecting commerce." 6 The term "affecting
commerce" has potentially a large coverage-"all conduct having such
consequences that constitutionally [Congress] can regulate." 7 The
Board has, however, considered several factors in determining whether
particular businesses come within the terms of the act, including type
of customers served,8 inter-relation of local and interstate activities,°
separability of local and interstate operations,1° and percentage of sales
·or purchases made in interstate commerce.11 But over and above these
subs~ntive bases for deciding whether a particular business is covered,
the Board asserts its power to dismiss if (I) the business is essentially
local in nature, and (2) to. assert jurisdiction in such cases would not
effectuate the policies of the act. Since policy is at best an uncertain
basis in determining whether a given business will be covered, it becomes important to determine whether the Board is in fact acting within
its statutory powers when asserting a right to make these decisions on
policy grounds.
·
reprinted, 96 CoNG. Rllc. 3290 (1950); digested, 96 CoNG. Rllc. 3579 (1950)] would have
transferred the functions of the General Counsel to the Chairman and the Board, and abolished the General Counsel. The Hoover Commission had made no recommendations exclusively affecting the N.L.R.B. H. Res. 512, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950) and S. Res. 248, 81st
Cong., 2d sess. (1950) both expressed disapproval of Reorganization Plan Number 12. The
plan was disapproved by the Senate on May 10, 1950, 96 CoNG. Rllc. 6874 (1950).
Sectio~ IO(a), National Labor Relations Act as amended in 1947.
Polish National Alliance v. N.L.R.B., 322 U.S. 643 at 647, 64 S.Ct. 1196 (1944).
s New York Steam Laundry, 80 N.L.R.B. 1597 (1949).
9 Spickelmeier Co., 83 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1949).
10 Duke Power Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 652 (1948); Bangor Auto Body Shop, 82 N.L.R.B.
No. 76 (1949); Collins Baking Co., 83 N.L.R.B •. No. 88 (1949); cf. Fehr Baking Co., 79
N.L.R.B. 440 (1948).
·
11 New York Steam Laundry, 80 N.L.R.B. 1597 (1949), where only 7% of receipts
were derived from interstate commerce.
6

7
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I
Congressional Intent to Curb Board Discretion

Under the original act, the Board had wide discretion in matters of
procedure and evidence,12 and free reign to decide whether taking
· jurisdiction in a given case would accord with the goals and policies of
the act. 13 As a result, the outlook of Board decisions varied greatly from
time to time.14 Since this vacillation was to varying degrees duplicated
in other administrative bodies, Congress limited free and uncontrolled
discretionary power generally in this so-called fourth branch of government by the Administrative Procedure Act, part of which called for
limited separation of prosecuting from judicial functions of administrative bodies.15 Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act seems clearly to have
intended further and more basic changes in the nature of the Board,
although whether they used adequate language for the purpose is another question. Board discretion in procedural matters was curbed.
Section IO(c) requires that a finding of an unfair labor practice must
be based on the "preponderance of evidence."16 By section IO(b) "any
such proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance
with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United
12Republic Aviation Corp. v. NL.R.B., 324 U.S. 793, 65 S.Ct. 982 (1945), allowing
the Board to infer from proven facts such conclusions as might be based on the facts proven.
Only limited review by the courts was available. N.L.R.B. v. Standard Oil Co., (C.C.A. 2d,
1943) 138 F. (2d) 885; N.L.R.B. v. Indiana and Michigan Electric Co., 318 U.S. 9, 63
S.Ct. 394 (1943).
13 Johns-Manville Sales Corp~ 61 N.L.R.B. I (1945). Scope of court review was also
limited in this area. Consolidated Edison v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206 (1938);
Packard Motor Car Co. v. N.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 485, 67 S.Ct. 789 (1947); Jacobsen v.
N.L.R.B., (C.C.A. 3d, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 96; N.L.R.B. v. Federal Engineering Co.,
(C.C.A. 6th, 1946) 153 F. (2d) 233.
14 "But there are difficult questions of policy involved in these cases, which, together
with changes in Board membership, account for the contradictory views that characterized
their history in the Board.••• We are not at liberty to be governed by those policy considerations in deciding the naked question of law whether the Board is now, in this case, acting
within the terms of the statute." Packard Motor Car Co. v. N.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 485 at 492,
67 S.Ct. 789 (1947).
15 60 Stat. L. 237, 5 U.S.C. (1946) §§lO0I-1011. Section 5(c) provides that "no officer,
employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigating or prosecuting functions for
any agency in any case shall, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the
decision, recommended decision, or agency review ••• except as witness or counsel in public
proceedings."
16 "The conference agreement provides that the Board shall act only on the 'preponderance' of the testimony-that is to say, on the weight of the credible evidence•••• [The Board's
decision] should indicate an actual weighing of the evidence, setting forth the reasons for
believing this evidence and disbelieving that, for according greater weight to this testimony
than to that, for drawing this inference rather than that. Immeasurably increased respect for
decisions of the Board should result from this provision." Conf. Rep. 510 on S. ll26, 80th
Cong., 1st sess. (1947) p. 53.
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States."17 Section 4(a) abolished the Board's review division and curtailed its supervision of trial examiners' reports.18 An extremely im,.. portant innovation was the establishment of the office of General
Counsel. The original House bill called for an administrator who would
act as an independent agency ,of the government, and whose function
would be to investigate and prosecute unfair labor practice charges,
independent of influence and control of the Board.19 In section 3(d)
. of the compromise bill these functions were given to the General
Counsel,20 which is evidence of an intent to limit the Board to quasijudicial functions.
Other provisions in the act indicate that Congress probably intended
to remove all discretion from the Board as to the prosecution of cases
and vest such discretionary power in the General Counsel. The Administrator und~r the House bill was to have little latitude in determining whether- to prosecute .unfair labor practice charges, even if he
found the case "inconsequential";21 this concept was carried into the
compromise bill. 22 TJ:ie minority members of the Senate recognized
and attacked this as a limitation on Board discretion, 23 and President
Truman attacked the innovation in his veto message. 24 Nor would the
17 "If the Board is required, so far as practicable, to act only on legal evidence, the substitution, for example, of assumed 'expertness' for evidence will no longer be possible."
Conf. Rep. 510 on S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947) p. 53.
lS "The combination of the provisions dealing with the authority of the General Counsel,
the provision abolishing the Board's review division, and the provision relating to the trial
examiners and their reports effectively limits the Board to the performance of quasi-judicial
functions." Con£. Rep. 510 on S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947) p. 37.
10 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947); H. Rep. 245 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st
sess. (1947).
2 0 "[H.R. 3020] contemplated that, in unfair practice cases, the Administrator would
investigate charges, issue complaints, and prosecute cases••.. [T]he conference agreement
contemplates that these duties will be performed under the exclusive and independent direction of the General Counsel." Con£. Rep. 510 on S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947) p. 53.
21 "It is only when the facts the complainant alleges do not constitute an unfair practice,
or when the the complainant clearly cannot prove his claim, that the Administrator has any
discretion not to issue a complaint. It is to be expected that, if a case is weak or is inconsequential, he may attempt to persuade the charging party to drop the case, or he may, without
acting as a mediator, conciliator, or arbitrator, suggest that the parties try to settle the dispute
between themselves." H. Rep. 245 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947) p. 40.
22 "Under this bill the counsel will have the right to make the decision as between
employer and employee; but his decision will be subject to the judicial decision of the Board,
and, above the Board, the courts••••" Senator Taft, 93 CONG. REc. 7538 (1947).
2 3 See for example, 93 CoNG. REc. 7441 (1947), where Senator Morse stated that the
General Counsel's power "is independent power, sole power, to determine what complaints
shall issue and what shall not." See also Senator O'Mahoney's indictment of the ''labor
czar," 93 CoNG. REc. 7524 (1947).
·
24 "It would invite conflict between the National Labor Relations Board and its general
counsel, since the general counsel would decide, without any right of appeal by employers
and employees, whether charges were to be heard by the Board, and whether orders of the
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language of the act as passed seem to warrant the exercise of discretionary power by the Board. By section IO(a) the Board is "empowered" to prevent unfair labor practices. Under section IO(c), "if upon
the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is
engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board . . . shall
issue ... an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such
unfair labor practices, and to take such affirmative action . . . as will
effectuate the policies of this act." The :final act certainly did not as
categorically limit Board discretion by its terms as did the original
House bill. But from pre-enactment materials and the quoted provisions of the act, enough may be gleaned to indicate that the Board was
. no longer to have unliJ:!lited freedom to deal summarily with cases as
it saw :fit. 25

II
Political .Implications of the Board's Activities

Upon an examination of cases, one cannot avoid noting the difference in treatment of the amended act by the courts and by the Board.
In dealing with the test Qf coverage under section· IO(a), "affecting
commerce," lower federal courts have given the act broad coverage over
local industries, which were not considered to be covered under the old
act. 26 Courts have readily granted injunctions against secondary boycotts in local industries affecting commerce when the Board has requested such relief. 27 Some federal courts in dealing with the changed
provisions regarding evidence have held that scope of review has thereBoard were to be referred to the courts for enforcement. By virtue of this unlimited authority,
a single administrative oflicial"might usurp the Board's responsibility for establishing policy
under the Act." 93 CoNG. Rile. 7587 (1947).
25 In retaliation against Reorganization Plan Number 12, Senator Taft submitted S. 3339,.
81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950), which would establish an independent administrator and define
the duties of the N.L.R.B.
2 G Slaterv. Denver Trades Council, (10th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 608; Shorev. Building
and Construction Trades Council, (3d Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 678, holding that under the
authority of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82 (1~42) the act has application to
local cases where the activities charged would if multiplied into a general practice exert a
disruptive inHuence on interstate commerce calling for preventive regulation.
2 7 Section 10(1) authorizes the Board to seek temporary restraining orders against violations charged under 8(b)(4)(A). Slater v. Denver Trades Council, (10th Cir. 1949) 175
F. (2d) 608; Shore v. Building and Construction Trades Council, (3d Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d)
678; Cranefield v. Bricklayers Union, (D.C. Mich. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 611. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. Sperry, (10th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 863, held that a
secondary boycott was a prohibited activity which in local building trades activities could be
regulated as affecting commerce.
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by been increased. 28 The courts in general have applied the act as
written.
The Board at first deliberately strived to reach every conceivable
practice outlawed and new industry covered by the amended act, its
decisions after a time becoming harsher than those of the courts. Perhaps one of cynical outlook might conclude that there is a noticeable
correlation between the increasing harshness of Board decisions and
increased Administration efforts to do away with the Taft-Hartley Act.
During the summer of 1949 the Thomas-Lesinski (Administration)
bill, which in practical effect restored the original Wagner Act, was
replaced by the Taft substitute bill,29 which was passed by the Senate
on June 30, 1949. Since then, by coincidence or design, the Board
appears to have pursued a course :which apparently has vitiated the force
of the act in many respects. The General Counsel has resisted this
change in attitude, in furtherance of which policy dismissals by the
Board play a useful role. The following lines of cases serve to indicate
this change in approach to enforcement of the act.
· The Board has severely limited ~e scope of certain union unfair
practices under section 8(b). In the area of secondary picketing, forbidden under 8(b)( 4)(A), the Board first held in Matter of Sealright
Paci-fie, Ltd. 30 that it was secondary picketing where striking employees
followed their employer's trucks to their destination and picketed them
there. Matter of Pure Oil,31 however, involved a picket line around
the primary employer's dock, which employees of a second employer
also using the dock refused to cross. The Board held it was primary
action because confined to the primary employer's premises. A majority
considered ''hot cargo" letters not an· inducement to co:p.certed action
under 8(b)(4)(A). The Sealrighi case was narrowly limited in Matter of Schultz Refrigerated Service32 by a holding that where strikers

1

28 The Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 337 U.S. 656, 69 S.Ct.
1283 (1949) remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the scope of review
over Board findings had been enlarged by the new evidence requirements of the act. In
Pittsburgh Steamship Co. v. N.L.R.B., (6th Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 731, the court held that
section l0(e) of the act meant in light of section lO(b), (c) and (f) a broadened scope of
review, and indicated that even if this were not so, section 7(3) of the Administrative Procedure Act would result in broader review powers. Opposed are N.L.R.B. v. Minnesota Mining
and Manufacturing Co., (8th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 323; N.L.R.B. v. Booker, (5th Cir.
1950) 180 F. (2d) 727; and N.L.R.B. v. Universal Camera Corp., (2d Cir. 1950) 179 F.
(2d) 749, where Hand, J. indicated that he believed section lO(e) merely made definite what
had been implied under the old act. The Supreme Court will without doubt resolve this
conHict by rehearing the Pittsburgh Steamship case.
29 Labor-Management Relations Act of 1949, S. 249, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949).
so 82 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (1949).
a1 84 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (1949).
s2 87 N.L.R.B. No. 82 (1949).
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followed the struck employer's trucks to their destination it was "primary picketing" because the employer did business everywhere his
trucks went, even though the fact situation there and in the Sealright
case were similar. The result is certainly a-restricted application compared to the broad coverage which the language of 8(b)( 4)(A) and its
legislative history3 3 might warrant.
A similar pattern has appeared in Board decisions on the use of
"unfair lists" in the building trades industry. Matter of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners34 had stated that to place an employer
on an "unfair list'' was an inducement for other employees and employers to cea~e handling the goods or using the services of the primary
employer, and was therefore an unfair labor practice under section
8(b)(4)(A). But in the Grauman Company case35 the Board held
that the use of such an "unfair list," "whatever its psychological impact," does not induce employees of other employers to engage in a
work stoppage within the meaning of 8(b)(4)(A). The opinion went
on to state that even if such stoppag~ occurred, there was no intent
evidenced to produce the specified result. But it is difficult to see for
what other purpose the list was circulated in the construction industry
where no retail patronage by union members is involved.
The Board recognized in numerous cases after 1947 that the amended act was designed to reach the construction industry, in which the
secondary boycott and closed shop have been prevalent. 36 In the earlier
cases the Board did not claim the power to dismiss complaints of unfair
labor practices on policy grounds because the business was local, or for
any other reason,37 although it still claimed the right to exercise policy
33 See H. Conf. Rep. 510 on S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947) pp. 42-46; H. Rep.
245 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947) pp. 23-24, 44.
.
34 81 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (1949). See also Osterink Construction Co., 82 N.L.R.B. No. 27
(1949).
35 87 N.L.R.B. No. 136 (1949). See also Pure Oil, 84 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (1949) for
treatment of "hot cargo" letters.
36 J. H. Patterson, 79 N.L.R.B. 355 (1948). "Moreover, the legislative history of the
· 1947 amendments is replete with evidence that, especially where secondary boycotts were
concerned, Congress intended the Board to exercise its plenary power to protect small and
relatively local enterprises against the impact of union boycotts...." United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners, Local 74, 80 N.L.R.B. No. 91 (1948). The Board adopted the same
rule as the Court of Appeals in Shore v. Council, (3d Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 678, in United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 81 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (1949).
37 "The General Counsel having seen fit to prosecute this case, I believe that the Board
is under a duty to complete the task by asserting jurisdiction. If I thought the exercise of
Board discretion permissible, I would, consistently with the view expressed in representation
cases, refrain from applying the federal power to so local and so diminutive a controversy."
Chairman Herzog concurring in United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 81 N.L.R.B.
No. 127 (1949).
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discretion in representation disputes in the building industry.38 The
difference may ·be attributed to the method of initiation of Board
action-unfair labor practice charges are initiated by the General Counsel, representation disputes by action of the parties. But in the latter
part of 1949 the Board began its drive to assert policy discretion, both
in the construction· industry3 9 and in local and service businesses.40
It may well be that the Board is concerned only with case. load, or is
merely asserting an understandable combativeness against the claims
of the General Counsel. But it would also appear that such policy dismissals form handy precedents for avoiding cases involving industries
where union unfair labor practices are strongly entrenched, although
it is only fair to indicate that most such dismissals to date have been of
charges of employer unfair labor practices under the· several provisions
of section 8(a). Policy discretion would also be useful in avoiding such
cases as are still covered by the act under the Board's earlier restrictive
interpretation of the provisions of section 8(b)(4)(A).

III
Conclusions

From the legislative history of the act it would appear that Congress
intended by the separation of functions and by the changes in Board
rules of evidence and procedure that the Board should function primarily· as a quasi-judicial agency. Courts-themselves generally view disposition of cases on grounds of policy as extraordinary, particularly
when jurisdiction is conferred by statute. 41 However, extraordinary
remedies are ordinarily not granted as a matter of course, and the whole
area of equitable remedies is considered discretionary. 42 The applica38 In Liddon-White Truck Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1181 (1948) the majority found the "policies of the act can best be effectuated if the organizational activities ••• herein involved are
conducted within the framework of the act." Chairman Herzog, dissenting in J. H. Patterson,
79 N.L.R.B. 355 (1948), stated that "we do not share our colleagues' desire to exercise the
jurisdiction which appears sustainable as a pure matter of law. The fact that this Board may do
something does not mean it must or should."
39 Petredis & Fryer, 85 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (1949); Valley Concrete Co., 88 N.L.R.B. No.
116 (1950); Row Construction Co., 88 N.L.R.B. No. 132 (1950).
40 Hom-Ond Food Stores, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 647 (1948); Haleston Drug Stores, Inc., 82
N.L.R.B. No. 148 (1949); Haleston Drug Stores, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. No. 125 (1949); A-1
Photo Supply, 83 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (1949); Indianapolis Cleaners and Launderers Club, 85
N.L.R.B •. No. 202 (1949); Asax Co., 85 N.L.R.B. No. 199 (1949); Millage, 87 N.L.R.B.
No. 42 (1949); Childs Co., 88 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (1950).
41 ly1eredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 at 234, 64 S.Ct. 7 (1943) states that dismissal on policy grounds where diversity jurisdiction is properly invoked is possible only where
there is "some recognized public policy or defined principle guiding the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred, which would in exceptional cases warrant its non-exercise."
42 See Mer~dith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 at 234, 64 S.Ct. 7 (1943).
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tion of the de minimis doctrine is in practical effect a policy matter.
Exercise of the de minimis principle by the Board was approved under
the Wagner Act,43 and would hardly be denied even if the Board were
considered strictly judicial. But the Board is apparently not using de
minimis in its policy dismissals. 44 Nor would it seem that there is any
room for equitable-type discretion except as granted in IO(c) as to
remedies. On.e might well analogize diversity jurisdiction of federal
courts and jurisdictions over businesses affecting interstate commerce
as given to the Board, and argue for the limited discretion recognized
in the Milford case.
However, that the Board has repudiated any such limitations resting either in the act or in certain of its earlier decisions is shown by
the Board's reaffirmance of its position in the recent Haleston Drugs
case.45 The premise that Board discretion is inherent in the act would
not seem to be supported by the literal language of the act; the Board's
contention in the A-1 Photo Supply case46 that tliere was no Congres~
sional intent to "convert prosecutor into judge" seems unsupported by
legislative history of the· act as amended. The problem has not been
raised before the courts by the General Counsel,47 but Mr. Denham
has urged employers to contest Board policy dismissals. 48 A recent
federal case involving section IO(k) of the act, which provides for
Board hearings in jurisdictional disputes under 8(b)(4)(D), seems to
indicate that the Board could not decline jurisdiction for policy reasons.49 While not in itself a strong precedent for possible interpretation
43 N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 59 S.Ct. .668 (1939).
44 Board jurisdiction was upheld in cases where percentage of

interstate shipments was
small in comparison with total shipments of the business involved. For example, see N.L.R.B.
v. Green, Inc., (C.C.A. 4th, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 485 (less than 1%); J. L. Brandeis & Sons
v. N.L.R.B., (C.C.A. 8th, 1944) 142 F. (2d) 977 (.0024%). Dollar volume is apparently
no criterion for the Board. In New York Steam La9,I1dry, 80 N.L.R.B. 1597 (1949) the
Board took jurisdiction over a business whose purchases in interstate commerce totaled only
$97,000, and 24% of whose gross of $439,000 came from services to interstate carriers. Indianapolis Cleaners and Launderers Club, 85 N.L.R.B. No. 202 (1949) involved a policy dismissal where 7% of a gross of more than $11 million was gained directly in interstate commerce, much of the remaining being derived from businesses themselves affecting interstate
commerce.
4 5 86 N.L.R.B. No. 125 (1949). The Board seems to consider itself purely an administrative body, with no limitations on its discretion, either inherently or through Taft-Hartley.
46 83 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (1949).
4 7 Section IO(f) provides that "any person aggrieved" by a Board order may appeal to a
court of appeals for review. There may be some question as to whether the General Counsel
comes within the terms of the act, even though in ordinary court procedure a prosecuting or
district attorney may appeal adverse rulings.
48 In his New York speech, supra, note 3.
49 The lower court decision, Parsons v. Herzog, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 19, held
that a hearing was mandatory regardless of case load or other remedies available under the act.
The Court of Appeals reversed in part in Herzog v. Parsons, (App. D.C. 1950) 181 F. (2d)
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of sections lO(a) and lO(c), the case may indicate that the courts will
not favor capricious treatment of situations which the act was intended
to cover. It is not the Board's function to change the law to conform
with its own idea of proper policy and procedure.50 One cannot but
wonder if the field of labor law has not advanced to the point where a
regular tribunal presided over by judges of certain tenure is in order. 51
The Board's decisions, which seem to be subject to every change in
m~mbership, and to every change in political climate, are a strong
argument for tribunal which would work out a rational scope of coverage and adhere to it.
B. J. George, Jr.

781, holding that the Board could conduct preliminary investigations to determine whether
a cause of action was sustained by the evidence, and did not have to hear any case where the
irrational result of a hearing on an insufficient cause would result. The court did not consider the difference in language between IO(a) and IO(k) important in considering this point.
50 The Taft substitute bill, S. 249, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949) would have abolished
the office of General Counsel and placed the Board subject to the provisions of the Admin. istrative Procedure Act. But when the President attempted the same thing indirectly by his
administrative reorganization plan, Senator Taft in S. 3-339, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950)
reverted to the old House plan.
51 Under Article III of the Constitution, Congress may establish such lesser courts as it
feels necessary.

